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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs 
BRITTANY MICHELLE ACUNA, 
Defend a nt/ Appella nt. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 39678-2012 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Honorable Robert C Naftz presiding. 
Stephen G. Larsen 
155 S 2nd 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Lawrence G Wasden 
Attorney General for Idaho 
Statehouse Room 210 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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Statement of the Case 
The Magistrate in the court below, and the District Judge thereafter, ordered 
restitution to the State Insurance Fund after the Defendant/Appellant had 
entered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor amended from an initial felony charge. 
The change of plea was subject to a plea agreement whereby the Defendant 
agreed to pay restitution solely in the form of the victim's out of pocket expenses. 
After the entry of the Defendant's plea, and its acceptance by the District Judge, 
the State submitted a claim for restitution on behalf of the State Insurance Fund. 
Notwithstanding the language of the Plea Agreement, the Magistrate, on remand 
ordered the restitution above and beyond that set forth in the plea agreement. 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
On August 30,2010 Brittany Acuna was charged by criminal complaint with 
Battery Upon a Law Enforcement Officer, I.C. 18-903(a) and 18-915(3)(b), Tr 
69.70. She was accused of kicking officer Brown of the Pocatello Police 
Department during a scuffle with her then-boyfriend, Christopher Bishop. Brittany 
was also charged with misdemeanor Domestic Battery as a result of this incident. 
Police Report, Tr 79 et seq. 
Brittany waived her Preliminary Hearing before the Hon. Thomas Clark on 
September 13, 2010, and entered a Not Guilty plea to the Information before the 
Honorable Robert Naftz. The Defendant, through counsel, and the State through 
Deputy Prosecutor, Ja Niece Price entered into and executed a written Plea 
Agreement on March 31, 2011. That agreement is set forth beginning at Tr 109. 
Defendant entered a plea of Guilty to misdemeanor Battery, and the case was 
remanded to the Hon. Thomas Clark, Magistrate, for sentencing. 
After remand, the State of Idaho, again through attorney Price, submitted claims 
for restitution on behalf of the Idaho State Insurance Fund for monies expended 
on behalf of Officer Brown, notwithstanding the language in Paragraph 4 of the 
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Plea Agreement, Tr. 26-29. Judge Clark believed that such restitution was 
mandated by the Victim's Compensation Act, and ordered Brittany pay $4500 to 
the State Insurance Fund, Tr. 125, Transcript of Restitution Hearing 5. Defendant 
appealed 
The appeal was argued before District Judge Robert Naftz, and On January 
30,2012 he issued a Memorandum Decision upholding the restitution order of 
Judge Clark Tr. 45-56. This appeal followed. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. DID THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT BREACH THE PLEA AGREEMENT BY 
SEEKING RESTITUTION ON BEHALF OF THE STATE INSURANCE 
FUND? 
2. DID THE LOWER COURTS ERR IN ORDERING RESTITUTION TO THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND WHERE THE STATE VIOLATED THE PLEA 
AGREEMENT BY SUBMITTING THE FUND'S CLAIM TO THE COURT? 
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ARGUMENT 
1 
Defendant/Appellant, Brittany Acuna, entered into a written plea agreement 
with Respondent State of Idaho. She pleaded guilty to a charge of Battery, I.C. 
18-903, subject to a number of specific terms and conditions, among them, 
obtaining a domestic violence evaluation, attending anger management classes, 
AA group participation, twenty days incarceration on the SCHILD (Sheriff's Inmate 
Labor Detail) program, or community service, and out of pocket restitution to the 
victim, Officer Brown. The plea was accepted on April 4, 2011 by the Hon. Robert 
C Naftz, District Judge. Tr 112 et seq. By changing her plea, and agreeing to the 
specific terms, she changed her position in reliance on the mutual promises by 
the State. 
After remand, the State, in contravention of Paragraph 4 of the Agreement, 
submitted claims for restitution on behalf the State Insurance Fund, Tr. 26, 28. 
Defense Counsel objected. 
The recent case of State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 538,261 P3d 819 (App. 2011) is 
on point with the facts of this case. In Gomez, the State and Defendant had 
reached a plea and sentencing agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, Gomez 
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entered a plea guilty. The state thereafter, as here, sought restitution outside 
the ambit of the agreement finding the State had breached the agreement: 
"The parties took care to document the agreement in written form and there was 
no mention of restitution in the written agreement or in discussions on the 
record surrounding the plea and its terms. The issue was not raised until after 
Gomez had entered the plea-at the sentencing hearing during which the state first 
made direct reference to the fact that it would be requesting restitution, but did not 
indicate the precise amount." 
Similarly, in this case, the State did not seek restitution until after Acuna had 
entered her plea before Judge Naftz. Based upon the Gomez standard, and the 
case law supporting that opinion, it is clear the state breached its agreement with 
Acuna. 
Brittany Acuna has served her active probationary period, and on February 16, 
2012, Judge Clark placed her on "record check" probation, noting that Brittany had 
completed the programs and counseling addressed in the plea agreement. Tr. 
127 The Defendant has fully performed on her plea agreement with the state. 
Because Brittany has fully performed her bargain, and the state has breached, 
Appellant asks this Court to apply the remedy set forth in Gomez: vacate Judge 
Clark's restitution order .. 
"When a plea agreement has been violated by the prosecution, as a remedy the 
court may order specific performance of the agreement or may permit the 
defendant to withdraw the guilty plea (citations omitted). Here, it is undisputed that 
Doe has performed the required community service, written the essay on self 
defense, and otherwise complied with the terms of the original judgment, and the 
State received the benefit of its bargain. It would therefore be unjust merely to 
allow to withdraw his guilty plea and face the possibility of being tried and 
resentenced for the same offense. A remedy of specific performance will hold the 
State to its agreement, give Doe the terms he bargained for, and bring this case to 
an end." 
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2. 
While the State breached its plea agreement by seeking restitution for the 
Insurance Fund, the lower courts erred in entertaining the question of restitution 
outside the parameters of the Agreement, as well ruling that the "non binding" 
nature of the original agreement imbued them with authority to pick, choose and 
add provisions to an unambiguous plea agreement. Both the magistrate and 
district judge expressed the belief they were free to tinker despite the Defendant's 
material change of position and performance on the agreement. Acuna submits 
such tinkering is an abuse of discretion. 
By entertaining, weighing and considering the State's restitution motion, the 
lower courts became more than detached sentencing authorities. They became 
interveners in the contractual relationship between the parties, adding conditions 
and burdens not in the contemplation of the parties when the agreement was 
signed .. This was an impermissible ratification of the State's breach and 
misconduct. 
Judge Clark believed the agreement was superceded by the victim's 
Compensation statutes, citing I.C. 19-5304, Restitution Hearing Tr. 5. Judge Naftz, 
on the other hand, believed he could pick, choose or remake the agreement 
because it was "non-binding." He was free to accept the waiver of rights and guilty 
plea, and free to ignore Paragraph 4 governing restitution, Tr. 46 et seq. 
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Judge Naftz asserts: "just because a defendant fulfills certain obligations in 
a non binding plea agreement does not oblige the sentencing court to then accept 
all of the terms of such non-binding agreement." Tr. 54 Four pages earlier at Tr 
48, the Court cites a long line of authority on the due process rights of a defendant 
in entering into a plea agreement. That analysis is ignored, and the court views a 
change of plea as simply fulfilling "certain obligations". In this case, those 
"obligations" include the waiver of all constitutionally protected rights, and an 
admission of guilt. 
Quoting once again from the Gomez opinion: 
"Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly recognized that the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971), 
establishes that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, so it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. (citations omitted).We have 
recognized that this principle is derived from the Due Process Clause and the 
fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and 
intelligent. (citations omitted) Thus it is apparent that the breach of a plea 
agreement implicates a defendant's constitutional rights such that the first prong of 
our fundamental error analysis is satisfied." 
The court also refers to the principle in State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 573, that 
"restitution is a direct consequence of pleading guilty and therefore, a sentencing 
court may not impose restitution upon a defendant who pleaded guilty unless the 
defendant was advised of that possibility prior to the entry of the plea." 
First, Brittany Acuna was in part induced to change her plea based upon the 
limitation of restitution agreed upon by the State in Paragraph 4 of the Plea 
Agreement. Changing her plea in reliance on provision is obviously more than 
11 
fulfilling an "obligation." Second, neither Acuna nor her counsel were ever advised 
of an Insurance Fund claim for restitution until well after the plea was entered. 
The lower courts failed to make a critical distinction between this case and 
others involving Idaho Criminal Rule 11 "non-binding" plea agreements. In this 
case the state breached its agreement after the change of plea. That breach 
occurred by submitting documents to the sentencing court in contravention of 
Paragraph 4. Had the State honored its commitment, there would have been no 
restitution hearing because the State's attorney would simply have submitted the 
claim for the victim's out of pocket expenses not covered by insurance or workers 
compensation. In entertaining the Insurance Fund claim, the lower courts ignored 
the due process rights of the Defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the State breached its plea agreement with the Defendant by 
submitting a claim for restitution outside the scope of the Plea Agreement, and 
because the Defendant has fully performed her agreement with the State, this 
Court should strike the lower court's order of restitution. The claim on behalf of the 
State Insurance Fund was only before the lower court due to the breach by the 
State. That being so, the issue of the "non-binding plea agreement" is not relevant 
to the analysis of this case. 
Respectfully submitted this.2C?day of July, 2012 
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